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Many philosophers of music, especially within the 
analytic tradition, are essentialists with respect to 
musical experience. That is, they view their goal as that 
of isolating the essential set of features constitutive of 
the experience of music, qua music. Toward this end, 
they eliminate every element that would appear to be 
unnecessary for one to experience music as such. In 
doing so, they limit their analysis to the experience of a 
silent, motionless individual who listens with rapt 
attention to the sounds produced by either musicians a 
on stage, a stereo, or a portable device.2 This approach is 
illustrated in recent work by Nick Zangwill. Drawing on 
essentialist assumptions, Zangwill concludes that 
properly musical experience is effectively disembodied 
and radically private.3 While this seems plausible when 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 
Ninth Cave Hill Philosophy Conference, held at the 
University of the West Indies at Cave Hill, Barbados in 
November 2013, and the Aesthetic Experience and 
Somaesthetics Conference, held in Budapest, Hungary in 
June 2014. I would like to express my gratitude to the 
organizers and audiences of both conferences, especially 
Ed Brandon and Alexander Kremer, as well as Knox 
College’s Committee on Faculty Research for funding my 
travel to them. I also thank Krista Thomason and Eric 
Chelstrom for helpful comments on prior drafts of this 
paper. 
2 See, e.g., Peter Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical 
Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Jerrold Levinson, Music 
in the Moment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); 
and Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). In contrast to this trend, 
see, e.g., Kathleen Marie Higgins, The Music of Our Lives 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Lydia 
Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An 
Essay in the Philosophy of Music (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); Philip Alperson and Noel Carroll, 
“Music, Mind and Morality: Arousing the Body Politic,” 
The Journal of Aesthetic Education 42:1 (2008): 1–15; 
and Jesse Prinz, “The Aesthetics of Punk Rock,” 
Philosophy Compass 9:9 (2014): 583–593. 
3 Nick Zangwill, “Music, Essential Metaphor, and Private 
Language,” American Philosophical Quarterly 48:1 
(2011): 1–16, and “Listening to Music Together,” British 
we consider the essentialists’ paradigm case, Zangwill’s 
conclusion seems odd once we consider the wide variety 
of ways that people experience music. One’s body and 
social situation seem ineluctably enmeshed within the 
experience of, e.g., hot jazz played in a nightclub, where 
listeners bob their heads and dance to the music, cheer 
on the musicians, and socialize with their fellow 
concertgoers. The question this paper aims to answer is: 
should we consider this and similar experiences of music 
properly “musical”? I maintain that we should. Using the 
silent, motionless listener as the model, I argue, has in 
fact shaped the account of musical experience that 
essentialist philosophers of music have constructed. It is 
simply question-begging to assume that these other 
experiences are not properly musical just because they 
do not fit the essentialist model. In what follows, I show 
how our account of musical experience changes once we 
look at different ways of listening to and engaging with 
music. Far from the world of pure music that Zangwill 
and others relegate properly musical experience,4 I 
conclude that our musical experiences are fully 
enmeshed within the somatic, affective, and 
interpersonal dimensions of human life.  
 
The Limitations of Essentialism 
 
Zangwill’s account of musical experience rests on a 
distinction between what we can call pure listening and 
impure listening.5 “[L]istening that has a social or 
political aspect,” Zangwill writes, “is not really musical 
listening at all, but another kind of a listening, or it is a 
mix of proper listening and something else.”6 This 
                                                                       
Journal of Aesthetics 52:4 (2012): 379–389. 
4 Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, 489; and Zangwill, 
“Listening to Music Together,” 389. 
5 This distinction has parallels in the theories of both 
Kant and Hanslick. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer, trans. Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 153 (Ak. 5:271); and Eduard Hanslick, On the 
Musically Beautiful: A Contribution Towards the Revision 
of the Aesthetics of Music, trans. Geoffrey Payzant 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 15, 
50–54. 
6 Zangwill, “Listening to Music Together,” 382. 
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impure kind of listening is constitutive of experiences of 
music that are not properly musical. In contrast, when 
one experiences music purely, or acousmatically, one 
listens to it as if it were autonomous—that is, without 
regard for where, when, how, or by whom it is 
produced, or with whom it is heard. According to 
Zangwill, this is the only way to attend to and thus 
experience music properly, qua music. He writes, 
“[S]eeing music as a human product, as people playing 
instruments, achieving goals, and as historically and 
politically situated is all a misunderstanding and 
devaluation of the awesome elevation that musical 
experience can be.”7 Because impure listening is 
responsive to more than music per se—particularly, to 
the somatic, affective, and interpersonal dimensions 
within which the experience of music is usually situated 
and away from which pure listening abstracts—Zangwill 
denies that it is conducive to properly musical 
experience.8  
 
Zangwill also deems the experiences of music afforded 
by impure listening impoverished compared with those 
that pure listening affords us. In his view, the sounds 
that musicians produce are not themselves music; 
instead, the aesthetically sensitive listener transforms 
those sounds’ auditory properties into musical ones in 
the act of listening.9 To listen purely to those sounds is 
thus to musicalize them fully. By restricting one’s 
attention solely to the auditory properties of the sounds 
to which one attends, one can appreciate their full 
aesthetic and thus musical potential. In contrast, various 
ways of listening impurely musicalize the sounds one 
                                                 
7 Zangwill, “Listening to Music Together,” 389. He agrees 
with Scruton, who, in The Aesthetics of Music, writes: 
“The acousmatic experience of sound is precisely what is 
exploited by the art of music” (3). 
8 Of emotions in particular, Zangwill, in “Against 
Emotion: Hanslick Was Right About Music,” British 
Journal of Aesthetics 44:1 (2004): 29–43, exclaims: 
“[They] are a distraction from musical experience!” (33).  
9 Zangwill, “Music, Metaphor, and Emotion,” The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65:4 (2007): 391–400, 
398.  
hears to comparatively lesser degrees. Attending to 
what oneself or others are doing during a performance 
(or while a recording plays), because it removes one’s 
attention from the sounds one hears, does not allow 
their aesthetic properties to manifest fully. Because one 
does not experience the full musical potential of those 
sounds, one’s experience is less than properly musical.  
 
If we were to accept Zangwill’s distinction, then most of 
our experiences of music would not count as properly 
musical. Indeed, listeners in most of the world’s musical 
traditions would likely never have had a properly musical 
experience and would be worse off as a result. To listen 
to music purely is to treat it as an end itself. But the 
ways that one listens to the music while attending a 
punk rock show, singing with friends along to a pop song 
on the radio, and dancing with a partner to swing music, 
to mention just a few examples, is bound up within 
other activities—such as dancing, singing, and 
socializing—and is directed toward ends beyond merely 
appreciating how the music sounds—such as working 
out one’s aggression, reinforcing social bonds, feeling 
connected to the musicians, and dancing well. These 
other activities and concerns direct one’s attention away 
from what Zangwill considers the proper object of 
musical listening: the aesthetic properties of the sounds 
they hear. The object of one’s experience, therefore, is 
not the music itself, but the larger, social activity within 
which the music is a constituent. Since additional, 
nonmusical ends constitute the experiences of music 
that these examples describe, they are not properly 
musical by Zangwill’s lights.  
 
Zangwill’s view entails that for an experience of music to 
be properly musical we must remain wholly spellbound 
by the sounds we hear, our attention fixed upon and 
transfixed by their aesthetic properties. Anything that 
breaks the spell, that significantly shifts our attention 
away from the music and onto whatever the musicians, 
our fellow listeners, or we ourselves are doing, however 
momentarily, will produce a comparatively impoverished 
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experience.10 Consider the audience at a punk rock 
show. They do not attend exclusively to the music. They 
also attend to the spectacle it calls into existence: the 
sea of bodies set into tempestuous motion by the 
snarling performers thrashing away on stage. The 
audience also participates in that spectacle and, 
together with the band, co-constitutes it. All of this, 
combined with the nonmusical desires and goals that 
ground the audience’s participation—to be in the band’s 
presence, to hear a particular song live, to connect with 
their fellow fans, and so on—causes their listening to be 
impure and renders their experience less than properly 
musical. The musical element, it would seem, cannot be 
inalterably extracted from the other aspects of an 
audience member’s experience of the concert, as it both 
transforms and is transformed by those other aspects. 
This appears also to be true, mutatis mutandis, of singing 
along to a pop song, swing dancing with a partner, and 
indeed of most of our experiences of music. In Zangwill’s 
view, it consequently follows that one’s body and the 
social situation within which one hears the music make 
no significant aesthetic contribution to one’s experience 
of music, qua music. He thus considers properly musical 
experience to be effectively disembodied, occurring 
wholly within the private concert hall between one’s 
ears.  
 
The cases just discussed contrast sharply with those in 
which concertgoers listen to the music being performed 
quietly, motionlessly, and perhaps with their eyes 
closed, such as a typical concert of classical music. Such 
cases are paradigmatic of properly musical experience, 
in the essentialists view, because it appears that 
everything but the sounds and the individual listener’s 
responses to them can be eliminated from her 
experience of the music. But I contend that this 
appearance is deceiving. In the paradigmatically “pure” 
concert space, concertgoers deliberately cooperate with 
each other, in terms of not so much what they do overtly 
                                                 
10 Zangwill, “Listening to Music Together,” 382. 
as what they refrain from doing. Refraining from acting 
in a given way is itself a type of acting. It is the exercise 
of self-restraint. The norms regulating the behavior of 
concertgoers within the classical and other musical 
traditions specifically require them to refrain from 
distracting each other and the performers. Concertgoers 
tacitly agree to listen stilly and silently to the sounds 
emanating from the stage and to respond overtly to 
them only after they have ceased sounding or at other 
sanctioned moments—e.g., at a jazz concert, after the 
solos. In other words, concertgoers respond to each 
other continually and systematically, although covertly—
in line with norms prevailing within the relevant listening 
practice—in order not to distract and thereby prevent 
each other from having the sort of elevating experience 
of music that Zangwill considers to be particular to pure 
listening.11  
 
Of course, concertgoers within these musical traditions 
sometimes do have occasion to correct other listeners, 
and even themselves, overtly during a performance 
should they transgress the prevailing norms. Someone 
having a coughing fit, e.g., will either be shushed or 
silently excuse herself. Individuals who are humming too 
loudly, or too vigorously tapping their toes, bobbing 
their heads, pretending to conduct, and so on, will be 
requested to restrain themselves or forced to leave. As 
rock musician David Byrne writes, specifically of the 
classical tradition: “Nowadays, if someone’s phone rings 
or a person so much as whispers to their neighbor during 
a classical concert, it could stop the whole show.”12 
                                                 
11 Zangwill, in “Listening to Music Together,” writes: 
“Listening to music is an isolated and lonely encounter 
with another world, a disembodied world of beautiful 
sound, far from the world of human life. […] Only by 
receding away from the human world, from the Other, 
can we go beyond humanity, to a world of pure music. 
To humanize music is to desecrate it. Music is inhuman, 
and awesome because of it, like stars in the night sky” 
(389). See also his “Against the Sociology of the 
Aesthetic,” Cultural Values 6:4 (2002): 443–452, 448–
449. 
12 David Byrne, How Music Works (San Francisco: 
McSweeney’s, 2012), 22. See also Alex Ross, “Why So 
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When listeners actively engage with one another during 
such a concert, their attention will be diverted from the 
music in a way that will have an appreciably deleterious 
effect on their musical experiences. Zangwill’s view is 
consequently correct in these cases. However, I argue 
that his view’s correctness is limited to only these cases.  
 
Total stillness and silence, as Byrne notes, is demanded 
in classical (and other) performance venues so that 
listeners can attend to the “[the] quietest harmonic and 
dynamic details and complexities” of the music being 
performed.13 But not all music possesses such aesthetic 
properties. Punk rock, pop, and swing music rarely do. 
To dance to or sing along with such music does not 
necessarily distract one’s attention from its salient 
aesthetic properties. Quite the contrary. By slam dancing 
to a punk song—i.e., by repeatedly hurling themselves 
into each other—those members of the audience 
embody its most salient properties: its raucous rhythm, 
aggression, and reckless abandon. Slam dancing can thus 
serve as a public manifestation of one’s appreciation of 
punk music, qua music. It can also shape how one 
appreciates the music, as one’s responsiveness to and 
pleasure in the aspects of the music one embodies is 
amplified, intensified, and modified by embodying them 
together with other fans in the band’s presence.14 As a 
result, rather than providing an impediment to 
experiencing the music properly, qua music, as Zangwill 
would have it, the nonmusical features of the 
experience—most especially, one’s active and reactive 
body—can positively contribute to it.  
 
 
This is not to say that every experience of which music is 
a part ought to count as properly musical. If the slam 
dancers at the punk show become too aggressive and 
                                                                       
Serious?” The New Yorker (September 8, 2008). 
13 Byrne, How Music Works, 22. 
14 In support of these claims, see, e.g., Joel W. Kruger, 
“Enacting Musical Experience,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 16:2–3 (2009): 98–123, and “Doing Things with 
Music,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10:1 
(2011): 1–22. 
unruly, they would certainly embody the aggression and 
reckless abandon of the song being played. However, 
their embodiment of these aesthetic properties would 
be largely coincidental to the music and, thus, 
unmusical. This is because they would be responding far 
more to each other than to the aesthetic properties of 
the sounds they hear, which would likely be on the 
furthest periphery of their attention. To slam dance 
musically, rather than unmusically, thus requires 
responsiveness to what is actually happening in the 
music—just as to sing along musically to a pop song on 
the radio requires one to stay mostly on key and in time 
with the music. 
 
As the preceding discussion indicates, Zangwill has a 
reasonable claim where one accepts his asserting 
something along the line that some people misjudge 
music on the basis of a misplaced attention on aspects of 
a performance other than the music itself. But his 
further assertion that attention on these nonmusical 
aspects is always misplaced, I argued, is false. Our bodies 
and social situations sometimes are constituents of a 
properly musical experience. Zangwill goes wrong 
specifically in assuming that because so-called impure 
listening encompasses more than what is essential to 
engender a properly musical experience that it 
necessarily affords us experiences that are less than 
properly musical.  
 
What it is to listen to and thereby experience music 
properly, I suggest, varies from tradition to tradition, 
genre to genre, and style to style. Proper musical 
attention depends primarily upon the norms regulating 
the listening practices within whatever tradition, genre, 
or style of music to which one happens to be listening. 
To slam dance at a punk show, dance with a partner to a 
piece of swing music, or sing along to a pop song, rather 
than purely listening to the music, does not necessarily 
mark a failure to treat the music properly, qua music. 
Instead, to respond to the music in overtly somatic, 
affective, and interpersonal ways is simply what it is to 
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attend to and thereby experience music of these types 
properly.  
 
Music in the Flesh 
 
Consider the case of swing dancing. To dance well 
together, a pair of swing dancers must be receptive and 
responsive to both the music and each other. Each 
dancer has the complex task of coordinating her bodily 
movements to certain of the music’s salient aesthetic 
properties—for instance, the vivacity of its rhythm or the 
playfulness expressed by its melody—and to her 
partner’s similarly coordinated movements. Audition, 
vision, proprioception, affective response, self- and 
other-awareness, and overt, often vigorous and 
sometimes technically demanding, bodily action are all 
integrally bound up within the dancers’ shared activity. 
Swing dancing thus involves reacting somatically, 
affectively, and interpersonally to the sounds the 
musicians produce, rather than contemplating them 
disinterestedly as one who listens to them purely does. 
Zangwill recognizes that dancing to music well requires 
understanding and appreciating it as music. He further 
recognizes that dancers will often mirror the music’s 
salient aesthetic properties in their bodily movements, 
which publicizes her musical understanding and 
appreciation.15 But he appears to reject what I take to be 
this claim’s principal implication: that by mirroring a 
piece of music’s aesthetic properties, dancers become 
appropriate site of properly musical attention.  
 
Because swing, similar to most dance music, most often 
lacks the subtler sort of aesthetic properties that 
demand pure listening to be appreciated—it is made to 
be danced to, after all—there is nothing, in principle, to 
prevent one from fully understanding and appreciating it 
while dancing to it. Listening to music, regardless of how 
purely or impurely one may do so, involves selective 
attention. One attends more closely to certain features 
                                                 
15 Zangwill, “Listening to Music Together,” 388.  
of the sounds one hears than to others and, in doing so, 
musicalizes them more fully than those that have 
receded to the perceptual background. These latter 
features, of course, will modify how one hears the 
former ones. Dancing to music is similarly selective. A 
swing dancer may embody, e.g., the vivacity of a 
particular tune’s rhythm more than she does the 
playfulness of its melody. Through embodying these 
salient aesthetic properties, the dancer becomes them 
for their duration. In responding in kind to her 
movements, her partner is thus responding to the music 
in the act of becoming it himself. To watch them dance 
together, therefore, is to watch the music come to life in 
a very real sense. A viewer can thus gain a deeper 
appreciation of the music than listening to it purely 
would likely afford. Of course, this is also—and 
especially—true of the swing dancers themselves. Since 
watching and responding to one another focuses their 
concentration upon and heightens their sensitivity to the 
aesthetic properties of the sounds to which they are 
dancing, the dancers’ respective musical experiences will 
almost certainly be intensified and enriched.  
 
It is worth mentioning that while listening and dancing 
both involve selective musical attention, the process of 
selection will not always be consciously directed. It will 
more often be somatic or affective. Consider a listener at 
a classical concert being made aware by an annoyed 
neighbor that she has been tapping her toes for quite 
some time. Here, the music’s rhythm and tunefulness 
are so compelling that they infect the listener, take 
possession of her foot—or, at the very least, animate 
it—and cause her to act in a way that she knows she 
ought not to act.16 Music can also be so infectious as to 
take full possession of one’s body. This fact has been 
well known since at least the ancient Greeks. It is what 
                                                 
16 For more on musical infection, see Stephen Davies, 
“Infectious Music: Music-Listener Emotional Contagion,” 
in Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, eds. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 134–148. 
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motivated Plato to place such severe restrictions on the 
sorts of music to which the citizens of his ideal city could 
listen. With most types of dancing, though, the aspects 
of the music the dancers embody is normally selected 
through the dialectical interplay of conscious direction 
and musical infection. This is especially true when some 
amount of choreography is involved and the dancers are 
well practiced, as is usually the case with swing dancing. 
As the dancers practice their routine together, their 
explicit propositional knowledge of how to move to the 
music is increasingly transformed into tacit bodily 
dispositions, which are activated by the music. The 
ultimate achievement would be to reach the point 
where, instead of needing to think about what 
movements they must execute to dance to the music 
well, the music will just flow through their movements. 
At this point, the dancers would be thinking through 
their bodies, as Richard Shusterman would put it, rather 
than with their heads.17  
 
What is true of those who dance to music is also true, 
mutatis mutandis, of those who make music. Any 
musician worth her salt knows that she plays with her 
hands—or the body parts relevant to her instrument—
more than she does with her head. She normally has to 
concentrate on what her hands are doing only when 
they flub a note or when the actions they must execute 
are especially technically demanding. Similar to dancing, 
playing music need not distract a musician’s attention 
from the music she (and her fellow musicians) produce 
in such a way that, as Zangwill would have it, her 
experience is rendered less than properly musical. It 
simply depends on the particular sort of music that she is 
playing. For instance, she might not be able to both play 
trumpet in a symphony orchestra performing 
Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring and also attend to the 
most subtle and complex aesthetic properties of the 
sounds that she and the rest of the orchestra are 
                                                 
17 Richard Shusterman, “Thinking Through the Body, 
Educating for the Humanities: A Plea for Somaesthetics,” 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 40:1 (2006). 
producing. But this would be possible with many other 
pieces of music across a wide variety of traditions, 
genres, and styles—especially those lacking the subtler 
and more complex aesthetic properties that most 
classical music possesses.18  
 
Similar to a dancer, a musician can embody the salient 
aesthetic properties of the music she produces and have 
a deeper, more intense musical experience as a result. 
Her body can also become an appropriate site of 
properly musical attention for those of us in the 
audience. Think of the grimacing bluesman, the 
thrashing punk guitarist, the possessed fiddler or jazz 
trumpeter, and the impassioned diva. Rather than 
causing our experience to be less than properly musical, 
as Zangwill claims it must,19 attending to the drama of 
the musician or musicians on stage and bearing witness 
to the thought and feeling they pour into the music 
opens us to aspects of the music we might have missed 
had we been listening purely, leading to a deeper, richer 
musical experience than we otherwise might have had.20  
Not only do we feed off of the musical energy that 
                                                 
18 To take another example, there is nothing, in principle, 
to prevent the experience of singing along with others to 
a pop song on the radio from being a properly musical 
one. The object of aesthetic attention in this case is not 
the studio recording itself, but instead the music the 
singers are producing together with it. These individuals 
are effectively accompanying the singer on the 
recording, and the object of their musical attention is, 
for better or worse, the resulting aesthetic whole. 
19 Zangwill, “Against Emotion,” 33. Compare to Hanslick, 
On the Musically Beautiful, 48–49. 
20 Vincent Bergeron and Dominic Lopes, in “Hearing and 
Seeing Musical Expression,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 78:1 (2009): 1–16, similarly 
argue that the mixture of pure listening with the various 
so-called “impure” modes of attending to music often 
enhances our musical experiences, especially by making 
us more sensitive to music’s emotional properties. This 
point appears to have been confirmed by Chia-Jung Tsay, 
“Sight over Sound in the Judgment of Music 
Performance,” PNAS 110:36 (2013): 14580–14585. 
Tsay’s research demonstrates that, when asked to judge 
which of a number of performers won a given music 
competition, “both expert and novice listeners privilege 
visuals above sound, the very information that is 
explicitly valued and reported as core to decision making 
in the domain of music” (14583). 
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musicians often exude. Musicians in many folk and 
popular traditions just as often feed off the energy we 
give back to them through our overt shows of our 
musical understand and appreciation. As a result, 
musician and audience can reciprocally elevate each 
other’s musical experiences. In bobbing our heads, 
dancing, and so on, to the musicians’ activities and their 
sonic results, we similarly embody some of the music’s 
salient aesthetic properties. With smooth jazz, one 
sways with the musicians to the groove; with hot jazz 
and swing, one dances vigorously in time with the bass, 
brass, and drums; with blues, one taps one’s feet and 
moves one’s head along with the guitarist’s fingers, 
often grimacing empathetically to the pain she wrings 
from the strings; with heavy metal, one bangs one’s 
head together with the guitarists; with rock, pop, and hip 
hop, one sings along with the singer during the chorus; 
and so on. As attentive audience members responding to 
and embodying the music in these ways, we show our 
appreciation not just of the music, but also for the 
musicians for affording us the opportunity to experience 
it, in two senses of appreciation: the first aesthetic, the 
second interpersonal. In doing so, our musical 
experience appreciates in a third, axiological sense of 
that term: its aesthetic value increases. These three 
senses of appreciation cannot be separated as easily as 
Zangwill and other essentialists believe they can be. 
 
Finally, consider the music director, conductor, or 
bandleader: an individual of whom Zangwill makes no 
note, but who is usually given a position of prominence 
in the listener’s visual field at classical and some jazz 
concerts. The music director’s role is not merely to direct 
the (other) performers’ actions. She also directs the 
audience to concentrate upon certain aesthetic 
properties as the musicians produce them. She does so 
both by gesturing to the site of their production in the 
band or orchestra and by mirroring with her baton or 
hands the properties those musicians are producing—
the melodic flow, the rhythmic pulse, the dynamic swell, 
and so on. By embodying aspects of the music, the music 
director becomes them for their duration and is thus an 
appropriate site of musical attention. From watching the 
music director alone, one can get a minimal sense of 
what is going on in the music. This is also true of the 
musicians she directs, especially of a featured soloist, 
whose physical separation from the rest of the band 
invites listeners to pay careful attention to both the 
actions she performs and their sonic results.  
 
In general, there is little apart from the willful exertion of 
self-restraint to prevent a musician from embodying 
salient features of the music they make. Where self-
restraint is not exercised, the musicians become proper 
sites of musical attention. There is also little apart from 
closing our eyes that can prevent those of us in the 
audience from witnessing the musical drama unfold on 
the stage. As a result, the musical experiences we have 
in most classical concerts halls and many jazz halls, 
which are paradigmatic sites of pure listening in 
Zangwill’s view, can be fuller-bodied than he and other 
essentialists allow. Moreover, I suggest that we ought to 
allow these musical experiences to be at least somewhat 
fuller-bodied than the current listening practice, which 
traces back to the late nineteenth century, allows them 
to be.21 This is because, as I have argued, (first) attending 
to aspects of the performance other than just the 
sounds can enable us to concentrate more fully upon the 
aesthetic properties of the sounds we hear, and (second) 
embodying some of those properties ourselves—by 
gently tapping our toes, softly swaying or bobbing our 
heads, and so on—can deepen and intensify, if even just 
slightly, our understanding and appreciation of them.22 
                                                 
21 For an in-depth examination of the history of the 
current listening practice within the classical (and bebop 
jazz) tradition, see Alexandra Hui, The Psychophysical 
Ear: Musical Experiments, Experimental Sounds, 1840–
1910 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012). 
22 On the likely multimodality of musical experience, see 
Bruce Nanay, “The Multimodal Experience of Art,” British 
Journal of Aesthetics 52:4 (2012): 353–363. On the 
advantages of seeing a performance live, rather than just 
listening to a recording through speakers or 
headphones, see Christy Mag Uidhir, “Recordings as 
performances,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 47:3 (2007): 
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Conclusion 
 
In the first section, I demonstrated the limitations of 
essentialism with respect to musical experience through 
a critique of a recent, sophisticated, and compelling 
instance of the view—namely, that of Nick Zangwill. In 
the second section, I explored the implications of one 
part of that critique: that certain ways of listening to 
music involve the embodiment of its aesthetic properties 
in human action. Throughout this discussion, we noticed 
the varieties of properly musical experience; the body’s 
centrality within them, as well as its own musical 
possibilities; the role of emotions, and the way the 
audience and musicians can feed off of each other and 
enhance each other’s musical experiences. Ultimately, 
what we noticed is pure listening is not the only mode of 
attention productive of intense and aesthetically 
valuable musical experiences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
298–314. 
My aim in this paper has not been to argue that we 
cannot, in principle, have the sort of musical experience 
that Zangwill claims is properly musical—even if I did 
suggest that we might not want to have them. My 
central claim, instead, has been that a theory of music 
ought to make sense of our actual lived experiences with 
music, in all their variety, and capture the ways in which 
they can rightly be said to be musical. But with the 
possible exception of those afforded by pure listening, 
Zangwill’s view does not satisfactorily capture our 
musical experiences. Contrary to Zangwill and others, 
there simply might be no single set of features essential 
to every properly musical experience. Instead, a wider 
set of features, at least some of which must be present 
in the way an individual attends to a given piece of 
music, might be constitutive of properly musical 
experiences.23 The investigation into what those features 
might be, however, must be left for another occasion. 
  
                                                 
23 It might even be the case that the object of a properly 
musical experience need not be music. That is, an 
individual could possibly have a properly musical 
experience in the complete absence of musical sound—
e.g., while viewing a painting by Wassily Kandinsky or 
Stuart Davis, watching a music-less dance performance, 
reading a Thomas Mann novel, or enjoying a meal or a 
walk through the woods. While consistent with my view, 
and highly suggestive, I do not have space to examine 
this possibility in this paper.  
